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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation evaluates the policy and production decisions that shape Hawaii’s longline 
fishery.  Chapter 1 develops a novel positive mathematical programming framework to evaluate 
the economic impact to individual fishers from proposed policy changes.  Chapter 2 estimates a 
Bayesian model of the joint production of desirable and undesirable catch and conducts a 
Bayesian decision analysis to optimize annual sea turtle interaction limits conditional on the 
value of sea turtles.  Chapter 3 examines the labor supply decision of Hawaii’s longline fishers 
by disaggregating the price and quantity components of revenue and estimating their 
respective relationships to fishers’ trip length labor supply decisions. 
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1. HOW DO FISHING POLICIES AFFECT HAWAI`I’S LONGLINE FISHING 
INDUSTRY? CALIBRATING A POSITIVE MATHEMATICAL 
PROGRAMMING MODEL 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Understanding the economic impact of a proposed policy is crucial for ensuring policy 
objectives are met without being excessively burdensome on the regulated industry.  In 
fisheries, managers are often responsible for preventing over-fishing of common-pool fish 
stocks.  This involves developing policies that balance biological sustainability with economic 
impacts to the fishing industry.  To date, many tools available to managers measure economic 
impacts at the aggregate industry-level.  These tools conceal important information on 
differences between the impacts felt by individual firms or by types of vessels.  Sorting firms 
that benefit and those that are harmed can help managers understand the economic 
implications from the policy and which policies are expected to be equitable.  
We investigate individual vessel response to fishery policy changes using a vessel and 
target-specific positive mathematical programming (PMP) model.  This research is important for 
several reasons.  To the best of our knowledge, there have only been three previous attempts 
to apply PMP modeling to fisheries, although none have been published in a peer-reviewed 
journal.123  This provides an opportunity to formalize the PMP model structure for fisheries, 
which will serve as reference point in the literature and encourage further model development.  
Given the panel data structure available for Hawaii’s longline fishery, we are able to evaluate 
the performance of the fishery PMP model by comparing out-of-sample predictions to 
observations from reference years.  By calibrating a vessel and target-specific PMP model, this 
paper provides insights into the range of individual vessel responses to realistic policy changes.  
Finally, this paper develops a flexible tool for fishery managers to evaluate heterogeneous 
policy impacts with relatively few data requirements. 
Recent research suggests that fisher heterogeneity is particularly important in the 
Hawaii longline fleet. Fishers have differing attitudes toward risk (Nguyen and Leung 2013), 
make entry/exit decisions depending on individual fisher characteristics (Pradhan and Leung 
2004), and choose remuneration schemes based on owner/operator status (Nguyen and Leung 
2009).  The network position of individual fishers in the industry has also been shown to play an 
important role in determining outcomes (Barnes et al. 2015).  These studies taken together 
largely invalidate the common modeling assumption that the Hawaii longline fleet is 
homogeneous and can be modeled using a representative vessel (Kasaoka 1989 and 1990).    
                                                        
1 Niels Vestagaard [1998] Policy Model for a Regulated Industry: From Command and Control to Property Rights in 
a Danish Multispecies Fishery, Dissertation Chapter.  
2John Walden [2006] Applying Positive Math Programming to a Fisheries Problem: Formulating the Closed Area 
Model Structure, Social Sciences Branch, NEFSC, Wood Hole, MA, 02543, Unpublished Manuscript. 
3 Kathereen Bisack and Gisele Magnusson [2009] Modifications to the Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Plan. Final 
Environmental Assessment, NOAA-NMFS Northeast Region. 
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Developing a model of individual vessel response to specific policy changes will, 
therefore, improve fleet-wide modeling accuracy.  For managers of Hawaii’s longline fishery, 
this has added significance given the economic prominence of Hawaii’s longline fishing fleet.  In 
2013, the fleet landed 27,053 tons of fish and generated $88.8 million gross revenues (WPacFIN 
2015).  The fleet primarily targets swordfish and tuna in the Eastern Pacific and Western and 
Central Pacific regions.  It is the largest commercial fishing fleet by revenue in the state of 
Hawaii, with between 124 and 135 vessels operating from 2005 to 2013 (WPacFIN 2015).  
The geographic scale and environmental effects of the fishery have led managers to 
implement numerous regulatory policies.  The fishery is subject to gear restrictions, turtle 
bycatch caps, and annual catch limit restrictions.  In recent years, the fishery has been forced to 
close a number of times after these policy limits were reached.  In 2006 and 2011, the fishery 
targeting swordfish was closed because the turtle interaction limit was reached.  In 2009, 2010, 
and 2015, the fishery targeting bigeye tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean was closed 
because the catch limit had been reached.  There is evidence that these closures may have had 
a dramatic economic impact on both producers and consumers in Hawaii (Allen and Gough 
2006).   
This paper examines how policies impact individual vessels by calibrating a vessel and 
target-specific PMP model for Hawaii’s longline fishing fleet.  By calibrating at the vessel-
specific level, we hope to capture the fleet’s heterogeneous composition of vessels and 
heterogeneous response to policy changes.  We also account for two primary fishing 
technologies targeting bigeye tuna and swordfish, and two policy relevant management areas 
for bigeye tuna, one in the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO) and the other in the Western Central 
Pacific Ocean (WCPO).  In order to make our model computationally feasible, and economically 
tractable we make several assumptions.  First, we assume that vessels are profit maximizing.  
We feel this assumption is appropriate when modeling a large commercial fishing fleet.  
Second, we assume economic, environmental, and biological conditions are stable, and base 
year observations are representative of the important economic relationships in the fishery. 
Under these assumptions, we model the fishery using an objective function that maximizes 
individual vessel profit subject to fleet-wide annual catch constraints.  Individual model 
parameters are then calibrated to reproduce input and output levels from an observed base 
year (2012).  Using the calibrated model and observed catch data from 2009 to 2013, we then 
examine model accuracy using out-of-sample model predictions. To demonstrate the model’s 
usefulness to fishery managers, we evaluate the impact of changing the catch limit policies for 
bigeye fishing in the WCPO. 
Although the first application of PMP was more than 25 years ago (Kasnakoglu and 
Bauer 1988), the PMP framework was formalized by Howitt in 1995.  The idea was to blend 
mathematical programming constraints, which proved useful for modeling resource and policy 
constraints, with “positive” inferences based on observed input allocations and production 
levels from a particular base year.  This approach was notably different from previous 
“normative” mathematical programming models (Day 1961, McCarl 1982) in that it was able to 
exactly reproduce observed inputs and outputs without relying on numerous “flexibility” 
constraints, which are an additional set of constraints added by the researcher to artificially 
avoid corner solutions.  The general PMP framework can be specified using many structural 
forms of production and cost functions allowing for non-linearity and substitution between 
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inputs, and can be easily calibrated using observations from a single year.  It is both consistent 
with microeconomic theory, and when applied to policy analysis, is able to generate smooth 
responses to policy adjustments. 
These desirable modeling characteristics have made the PMP approach common in 
agricultural economic modeling.  Recent versions of regional agricultural models employing 
PMP include SWAP in California (Howitt et al. 2012), CAPRI in Europe (Gocht and Britz 2011), 
and REAP in the US (Johansson et al. 2007).  These models are used repeatedly to evaluate 
regional agricultural response to policy changes.  Heckelei et al. (2012) and Merel and Howitt 
(2014) provided comprehensive reviews of regional agricultural models currently using the PMP 
framework and recent developments in the PMP literature.  There has also been significant 
work on developing the economic foundations of PMP, emphasizing accurate estimation of 
supply elasticities to be used as priors (Merel and Bucaram 2010), structurally consistent 
estimation of shadow values (Heckelei and Wolff 2003), and improved calibration methods 
(Garnache et al. 2015).  
By applying the most recent PMP framework developed by Garnache et al. (2015), this 
paper builds on extensive literature modeling fleet dynamics of Hawaii’s longline fishery using 
mathematical programming.4  The first model by E.R.G. Pacific, Inc. (1986), later modified by 
Kasaoka (1989 and 1990), applied a linear programming (LP) framework to optimally allocate 
fishing time across fishing regions and target species to maximize fleet-wide profits.  The 
results, however, did not accurately reproduce observed fishing behavior.  Miklius and Leung 
(1990) evaluated the LP model and concluded that this shortcoming resulted from the omission 
of micro-level decision-making by vessel owners and operators.  To address this problem, Pan 
et al. (2001) developed a two-level two-objective mathematical programming model which 
incorporated the behavior of fishers as well as fishery managers, including separate objectives 
of recreational and commercial fisheries.  Their approach produced more plausible optimal 
solutions, but it remained unclear whether the approximated profit maximizing behavior was 
representative.  The model also assumed that vessels within the fleet were homogenous and 
was, therefore, unable to capture the variation in vessel responses to changes in management. 
To address fleet heterogeneity in Hawaii’s longline fishery, Yu et al. (2013) used an agent-based 
model.  While the agent-based model was able to capture some of the detailed behavior of 
individual fishers, there remained a fair amount of discrepancy between predicted and 
observed performances.  The agent-based approach to simulation also required significant 
model updating and refinement as well as specialized users to operate the software. 
Our approach using the PMP framework is intended to be used by policy makers and 
managers, as well as academics.  The vessel and target-specific PMP model is able to capture 
fleet heterogeneity, separate fishing technologies and regional policies, and measure the 
distributional effects from changes to fishery policy.  It requires minimal data to calibrate, and is 
amenable to a wide range of resource and policy constraints including catch limits, and 
protected species interaction caps.  It is also able to exactly reproduce base year inputs, costs, 
revenues, and profits for individual vessels without relying on additional constraints.  For these 
reasons we feel it will be able to address previous modeling limitations. 
                                                        
4 Curtis and Hicks (2000) investigated the impacts of fishery closure due to turtle interaction caps using a random 
utility model to account for spatial choice behavior of fishers.   
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This paper makes four important contributions to the literature.  First, the paper adapts 
the PMP framework developed for agriculture to a framework that can be applied to fisheries in 
general.  With only a handful of notable exceptions, research using PMP for fisheries policy 
analysis has been very limited.  Second, by calibrating a vessel and target-specific PMP model, 
we are able to demonstrate a technique to examine the heterogeneous nature of the fishing 
fleet and the heterogeneous responses to specific policy changes.  Previous literature on 
Hawaii’s longline fishery has made significant progress to address fleet heterogeneity, but this 
paper provides a method that explicitly models individual vessels and fish targeting decisions, 
and requires less data and less effort to calibrate and conduct policy simulations than previous 
frameworks.  Third, it provides a rigorous out-of-sample evaluation of the accuracy of PMP 
model predictions.  Although PMP models have been used extensively for policy analysis, model 
predictions are rarely evaluated.  The panel data we have on Hawaii’s longline fishery enable us 
to make out-of-sample predictions for catch and evaluate the model’s predictive accuracy.  
Finally, the calibrated PMP model of Hawaii’s longline fishery provides a valuable tool for 
resource managers and policy analysts to evaluate the heterogeneous economic impacts of 
specific fishery policies and determine which policies are likely to encounter industry support or 
opposition. 
 
1.2 Data 
 
To calibrate the PMP model, evaluate its performance, and simulate policy outcomes, 
we used data from four sources.  We obtained data on individual vessel input costs for 2005 
from the 2005 cost and earnings survey (Pan 2015a), and for 2012 from the 2012 cost and 
earnings survey (Pan 2015b).  We obtained data on annual vessel catch from 2005-2013 using 
the dealer data from the State of Hawaii (Western Pacific Fisheries Information Network 2015).  
We obtained data on annual hooks deployed from 2005-2013 from Federal logbook data 
(Fisheries Monitoring and Analysis Program 2015).  To evaluate out-of-sample prediction 
accuracy we adjusted all input and output prices to 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index 
for all urban consumers nationally.  Input levels for the variable costs were then scaled relative 
to the number of fishing hooks deployed to enable efficient optimization during model 
calibration and simulations.  Prices of inputs were adjusted using the inverse scaling ratio to 
preserve the observed expenditure for each input.  We were able to match vessels across data 
sources using vessel name, permit number, and commercial license.  
In 2012, there were 129 vessels operating in Hawaii’s longline fishery.  Of the 129 
vessels operating, 114 were represented in the cost and earnings survey (Pan 2015b).  We 
imputed input cost for missing vessels using random regression imputation considering gear 
usage, vessel catch profile, and time spent on each target as regression variables.  Variable 
costs were then grouped into six categories: fuel, captain pay, crew pay, bait, other, and gear.  
We grouped fuel and oil costs under fuel, fixed captain pay and shares paid to the captain 
under captain pay, combined crew fixed pay and crew shares paid under crew pay, total bait 
costs under bait, and gear replacement cost under gear.  Table 1 shows the degree of fleet 
heterogeneity based on these inputs.  According to the survey data, total variable costs 
exceeded total gross revenue for six vessels.  Rather than dropping these vessels because they 
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violated the profit maximizing assumption, we scaled their input costs such that annual profits 
were 0. 
We then disaggregated individual vessel expenditure, catch, and revenue by three policy 
relevant targets: bigeye EPO, bigeye WCPO, and swordfish.  The EPO and WCPO management 
regions are separated at 150 W longitude.  Bigeye and swordfish fishing sets differ by depth, 
with swordfish lines set shallower than deep set bigeye lines.  We used set-type and location 
from 2012 logbook data to calculate the proportion of total trip time spent each trip on each 
target.   Trip target time was then aggregated by vessel over the entire year indicating how 
much time each vessel spent on each target for 2012.  Using the dealer data from 2005-2013, 
we matched vessel trips to observed landings to calculate annual catch and revenue by vessel 
and target.  Observations in the dealer data recorded daily sales.  Fish sales were either 
recorded by individual fish or groups of fish sold together.  Daily vessel revenue was calculated 
by multiplying pounds sold per fish, or group of fish by recorded ex vessel price per pound.  The 
data were then aggregated on vessel and year to calculate the annual pounds of swordfish and 
bigeye caught, and the total value of vessel catch.  These data were then used to calculate fleet-
wide average price of swordfish and bigeye, vessel-specific price premium for swordfish and 
bigeye, and price of non-target catch representing its added value.  Input expenditures for each 
vessel were disaggregated by target according to the proportion of time spent on each target in 
2012.  Table 2 summarizes the total active fleet size, and model sample size for each target over 
the years 2005-2013. 
 
1.3 Model Specification 
 
The PMP framework consists of an objective function defining profit maximization and 
resource and policy constraints that restrict input allocation decisions.  To allow for non-
linearity in production and limited substitution between inputs we chose to use a generalized 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, and for simplicity a linear 
expenditure function.  When paired with a CES production function, the linear expenditure 
function allows for smooth responses to changes in policy and resource constraints without 
adding more parameters to calibrate.  We define subscript ! to index the set of 128 vessels in 
our sample, " indexes targets EPO, WCPO, and SF, and # indexes inputs for fuel, captain pay, 
crew pay, bait, other and gear.  Given a CES specification the production function for vessel ! 
targeting " is given below. 
$%,' = )%,' *+,%,-,'./%,-,'01- 2
31
 
 We define the scale parameter for vessel technology as )%,', input share as ,%,-,', elasticity of 
substitution as 4, and the returns to scale coefficient as 5.  By relating effort to catch, the scale 
parameter is analogous to a vessel-specific catchability parameter in traditional fishery 
production models.  The returns to scale coefficient is defined using a myopic definition 
(Garnache et al. 2015) relating returns to scale to supply elasticity (6)   5789 = 61 + 6. 
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Because there have been no direct estimates of supply elasticity of catch in Hawaii’s longline 
fleet, we assume 6=0.5, which lies in the range of published supply elasticity estimates for the 
Gulf of Mexico fishery (Zhang and Smith 2011). To simplify notation, we use a transformed 
elasticity of substitution defined as 4 = = − 1= , 
where the untransformed elasticity of substitution (=) is assumed to be 0.17 for all inputs. At 
present, we are unable to estimate an elasticity of substitution from the data available, and the 
value of 0.17 allows for limited substitution between inputs, which we borrow from the 
agriculture literature and feel is reasonable in a fishery setting (Howitt et al. 2012).  Model 
sensitivity analyses for these assumptions are provided in Figure A1 and indicate our results are 
robust to changes in assumed parameter values. 
Although our production function only models targeted catch, fisher’s revenue will depend on 
their ability to land quality fish, and on the value of non-target but commercially valuable 
bycatch.  To fully capture these components of revenue we model the price of swordfish and 
bigeye separately for each vessel.  The fleet-wide average prices for swordfish and bigeye are 
given by ?%,@A , and ?%,BC, vessel-specific price premiums for swordfish and bigeye accounting for 
variation in quality are given by ?%,@AD' , and ?%,BCD' , and the additional values from non-targeted 
bycatch are given by ?%,E@A , and ?%,EBC.  By adding these three components together, we specify 
a vessel-specific price for bigeye (BE), and swordfish (SF). ?%,FG = ?%,@A + ?%,@AD' + ?%,E@A  ?%,HIJ = ?%,KLIJ = ?%,BC + ?%,BCD' + ?%,EBC  
This specification allows us to exactly reproduce observed vessel revenue, while only modeling 
the production of the policy relevant targets.  Implicit in this price specification we assume the 
price of bigeye from the EPO is the same as bigeye from the WCPO, which we feel is reasonable 
given they belong to the same species and are both caught throughout the year.  
 For simplicity, we specify a linear expenditure function.  The input cost data only 
provides total annual costs per input, therefore we assume input prices (M%,-,') are 1, which 
implies input levels (/%,-,') are in dollar units.  The choice set /%,-,' is the vector of individual 
vessel input levels for each target.  Profit maximization is constrained by three policies.  We 
model annual catch limits for bigeye tuna in the EPO (OPQHIJ) and WCPO (OPQKLIJ), and a 
total annual catch limit for swordfish (OPQFG).  Vessel heterogeneity implies that the 
unobserved value of catch for each constraint will vary by vessel.  We therefore define the 
unobserved value of catch as R%,'  over vessels and targets.  The maximization problem is given 
below. 
  maxVW,X,Y ∑ ∑ [(?%,' + R%,')$%,' − ∑ M%,-,'/%,-,'- ]'%  
  ^. _. 
  ∑ $%,HIJ% ≤ OPQHIJ 
  ∑ $%,KLIJ% ≤ OPQKLIJ  
  ∑ $%,FG% ≤ OPQFG 
 
1.4 Model Calibration 
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We adapted the calibration procedure developed by Garnache et al. (2015).  Their 
calibration procedure is the most recent methodological advance in the PMP literature, 
comprehensively addressing the criticism by Heckelei and Wolff (2003) regarding the calibration 
of shadow values.  Rather than estimated using an LP or ad hoc measures as was done 
previously, all unknown parameters and the shadow values are calibrated simultaneously using 
the same structural forms as used in model simulations, in this case a CES production function 
with a linear expenditure function.  Garnache et al. (2015) calibrated a PMP model for 
agriculture. In agriculture, the constrained input is typically land, however, in fisheries, 
production inputs can be purchased at any desired level on a common market and the 
constrained resource is catch.  We adapted the calibration procedure to account for this 
difference. For each target we specified a shadow value (a').  We then calibrated the model by 
minimizing the sum of squared error between observed expenditures and model expenditures 
resulting from the choice variable a'  as specified below.  mind ++e(?%,' + a')fg%,'5 −+M%,-,'- h
i
'%  
The objective function is subject to four sets of constraints that determine the calibration of 
unknown parameters.   The first set of constraints requires production parameters reproduce 
observed output (fg%,') for each vessel and target. 
fg%,' = )%,' *+,%,-,'./%,-,'01- 2
31 	, ∀	!, " 
The second set of constraints requires the first order conditions of profit maximization hold. 
The first order condition will be specified for each input, vessel, and target as below. 
?%,')%,'5 *+,%,-,'./%,-,'01- 2
31lm ,%,-,'./%,-,'01lm
= M%,-,' − .a'+R%,'0)%,'5 *+,%,-,'./%,-,'01- 2
31lm ,%,-,'./%,-,'01lm	, ∀	!, #, " 
 The third set of constraints allows us to recover the vessel and target-specific unobserved 
value of catch (R%,'). 
?%,'+⎣⎢⎢⎢
⎡)%,'5 *+,%,-,'./%,-,'01- 2
31lm ,%,-,'./%,-,'01lm⎦⎥⎥⎥
⎤
-
=+M%,-,'- − .a'+R%,'0)%,'5+⎣⎢⎢⎢
⎡*+,%,-,'./%,-,'01- 2
31lm ,%,-,'./%,-,'01lm⎦⎥⎥⎥
⎤
- 	 , ∀	!, " 
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Finally, our calibration procedure requires that for each vessel-target combination the sum of 
the input share parameters is one. +,%,-,'- = 1	, ∀	!, " 
 
1.5 Calibration Results 
 
The PMP model calibration procedure is designed to calibrate unknown parameters and 
constraint shadow values such that profit maximizing vessels, subject to the base year resource 
constraints, will optimally allocate the observed base year levels of input, generating the 
observed outputs and revenues, and the observed expenditures.  To evaluate whether the 
calibration was successful, we examine the range of calibrated parameter values and the 
differences between the observed and the modeled input levels using the base year catch 
constraints in 2012. 
In Table 3, we present the range of calibrated model parameters. The largest magnitude 
of variation is found in unobserved shadow prices of catch and the scale parameters.  These 
parameters carry the most weight for modeling the heterogeneous responses of the fleet.  The 
share parameters also show significant variation indicating the model captured a large amount 
of vessel heterogeneity in input expenditures.   Across targets, the share parameter for fuel are 
consistently larger than the other inputs, which is expected given fuel is the largest single input 
cost.  To verify the calibration procedure, we examine the differences between observed and 
modeled input levels for each input and each vessel’s output using the base year constraints.  
The largest difference in input is 2.02x10-14% and the largest difference in output is 9.53x10-6%. 
Such small differences indicate that we achieve an accurate calibration of all unknown 
parameters, and that our model can very closely replicate the observed base year economic 
behavior of each vessel. 
To further verify the calibration procedure, we compare the shadow values to the 
observed average price per pound of fish.  The shadow value on each resource constraint can 
be interpreted as the value of relaxing the resource constraint by one pound of either bigeye or 
swordfish.  Taken in absolute value terms, the calibrated shadow values of -7.70, -7.57, and -
4.45, representing bigeye catch in the WCPO, EPO, and swordfish catch respectively, appear to 
be accurately calibrated.  When compared to the average observed price per pound of bigeye, 
and swordfish ($7.99, $4.30 respectively), our calibrated shadow values are within a few cents 
of the average observed fish prices.  Although average prices and shadow values do not share 
the same interpretation, comparing the two does provide a useful validation of the overall 
calibration procedure. 
 
1.6 Prediction Accuracy 
 
We evaluate model predictions in two ways.  First, we compare predicted and observed 
catch from 2009 to 2013.  Of the 128 vessels modeled, 126 were operating in 2013; however, 
going back to 2009, as few as 119 of the original 128 were previously operating (Table 2).  For 
each year, we simulate the model by setting the fleet-wide catch constraint less than or equal 
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to the total observed catch of the vessels remaining from our 2012 sample.  This implies that 
our simulated fleet size decreases as vessels operating in 2012 are no longer observed in more 
distant years.  To account for changes in input costs over time, we adjust the cost of fuel using 
U.S. number 2 diesel retail price5 and the costs for captain pay and crew pay using annual salary 
data from Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational profiles for farming, fishing, and forestry 
occupations.6 Regressing the predicted revenue on observed revenue for the years 2009-2013, 
we examine the correlation coefficient and the amount of variation explained by our model 
(Figure 1).  We find the model performs best predicting bigeye catch in the WCPO, modestly for 
bigeye catch in the EPO, and poorly for swordfish catch.  The best out-of-sample model 
predictions are made for the 2011 bigeye catch in the WCPO (R-squared=0.35, correlation 
coefficient=0.53).  For all targets, model predictions become less accurate moving further in 
time away from the calibrated base year.  This is expected as biological stock level, individual 
fishing location decisions, and environmental conditions could vary substantially over this time, 
while our model assumes conditions remain constant.  In the short-term the model makes 
reliable predictions of individual vessel catch for the largest target in the fishery, bigeye in the 
WCPO.   
Second, we evaluate the model input level predictions for each target comparing the 
observed input levels from the 2005 cost and earnings data to the predicted input levels 
simulated using our PMP model. Results are shown in Table 4.  In order to compare the values, 
we match vessels that appear in both sets, reducing our sample to 71, 25, and 1 for the WCPO, 
EPO, and SF targets respectively.  Results from a paired Wilcoxon test comparing the observed 
and predicted input expenditures show the model significantly under-predicts all inputs except 
gear and bait for the WCPO target.  The model tends to over-predict input costs for the EPO 
target, and it over-predicts all inputs except fuel for the one matched vessel targeting SF.  By 
comparing observed expenditures in 2012 (Table 1) to 2005 (Table 4), the primary source of 
prediction error is the large differences in the observed expenditures between 2012 and 2005.  
For instance, fundamental changes to the remuneration schemes over these years, including 
the wide-spread transition from crew shares paid to domestic crew to fixed pay for foreign 
crew, could account for the observed differences in crew pay and captain pay.  We also 
observed a reduction in fuel expenditures in 2005 in the WCPO and EPO, and increase in SF, 
which could reflect a change in fishing grounds requiring more or less travel time than in 2012.  
Similar explanations could account for differences in other input expenditures predicted for 
each target.  Gear and bait expenses, which we expect to be most closely tied to catch, 
generate the closest predictions and are not sensitive to changes in remuneration scheme or 
fishing location.  Any changes to the fundamental cost structure of the fleet are expected to 
alter model parameter values and reduce the accuracy of forecasts.  This limitation is common 
to all model based forecasts. 
 
1.7 Policy Simulations 
 
                                                        
5 https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=EMD_EPD2D_PTE_NUS_DPG&f=A 
6 http://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm 
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To demonstrate the usefulness of a vessel-specific PMP model for Hawaii’s longline fishery, we 
examine vessel responses and impacts on individual vessel catch to changes in the annual catch 
limit policy.  We simulate two policy changes.  The first is a policy that increases the annual 
catch limit of bigeye in the WCPO by 10% from the 2012 base year.  The second is a policy that 
decreases the same catch limit by 10% from the 2012 base year.  A 10% change in the catch 
limit policy is roughly in line with the agreed upon changes for bigeye in the WCPO in the next 
few years which will see catch limit decrease 11% from 3,763 metric tons in 2014, to 3,345 
metric tons in 2017. 
 The vessel-specific nature of our PMP model allows us to evaluate the distributional 
effects of such policy changes.  We expect that individual vessels will respond to varying 
degrees, depending on factors such as technological efficiency and profitability, which makes 
them more or less sensitive to policy changes.  In Figure 2, we present the distribution of catch 
responses given an increase and decrease in bigeye catch limits in the WCPO.  The range of 
responses is large.  With a 10% increase in catch limit, we see that vessels respond by increasing 
catch from less than 5% to 20%.  With a 10% decrease in catch limit, the responses are 
symmetric to the 10% increase policy.  Vessels reduce catch from less than 5% to 25%.  Given 
the range in policy responses, individual vessels will clearly be affected differently.  Some will 
be highly sensitive to policy changes; most will experience moderate impacts.  Understanding 
the distributional implications is clearly important for evaluating economic impacts of fishery 
policies in Hawaii’s longline fishery. 
 
1.8 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have shown that the vessel and target specific PMP model of Hawaii’s 
longline fishery reliably predicts short-term effect of policies on bigeye catch in the WCPO and 
EPO.  Model predictions are more accurate when simulating vessel responses close to the base 
year, but lend some insight even at further distances.  By calibrating at the vessel-specific level, 
we are able to identify the range of economic responses to policy changes, capturing the 
heterogeneous nature of Hawaii’s longline fleet.  This more realistically models vessel 
responses, as well as provides an evaluation of the distributional effects of policy changes on 
catch, which is important for evaluating the stability of new policies.  For fishery managers, the 
PMP model of Hawaii’s longline fishery provides a valuable tool for evaluating the economic 
impacts of current and potential fishery policies.  
The PMP framework also provides a rich structural model with which we can study 
fisheries in general.  Later work will address parameter instability resulting from fundamental 
changes to underlying economic relationships or environmental and biological conditions, and 
estimate target switching decisions made by fishers.  We will also consider the effects of 
overlapping policy constraints such as turtle interaction caps, and explore the individual vessel 
characteristics that make certain vessels more sensitive to policy changes than others. 
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2. BALANCING GOODS AND BADS: A BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF FISHERY 
REGULATORY DECISIONS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Many industries jointly produce desirable and undesirable outputs.  When production of 
undesirable outputs causes noticeable damage, such as harming fish in a stream in Stigler's 
(1952) example, demand for regulation grows. But, industry regulators face a trade-off.  If they 
set regulations too loosely, the industry continues to generate an excess of undesirable 
outputs.  Conversely, if their regulations are too tight, the industry produces fewer desirable 
outputs.   
Coase (1960) provided a generalized model for such a decision problem.  He framed the 
problem with respect to two firms: A and B.  He noted that if the activity of A harms B, any 
restraint of A would also cause it harm. The regulatory decision then becomes whether, and to 
what extent, A should be allowed to harm B, or B to harm A.  It becomes clear from Coase's 
model that the initial reason for a given regulatory decision, that is to keep A from harming B, 
provides insufficient support for regulatory restraint.  Regulators must also account for the 
damages caused to the other firm by their regulatory decision.  Coase determined that the 
appropriate decision only becomes clear once we know the value of the damages, and the 
value that is lost to reduce those damages.  In practice, these values are rarely made 
transparent during the decision process.  Yet, without this information, we are unable to 
evaluate regulatory decisions, and judge whether or not they are optimal.  To solve this 
problem, we need a transparent methodology to estimate these values, and clearly show how 
they affect regulatory decisions. 
In this paper, I present an analysis of the regulatory decision problem facing fishery 
managers tasked with balancing desirable fish catch with undesirable bycatch.  In particular, I 
focus on bycatch regulations pertaining to endangered sea turtles caught by Hawaii's longline 
fishery.  Fishery managers are directed by legislation to promote commercial fishing “under 
sound conservation and management principles (Magnuson-Stevens Act 104-297).”  As applied 
to Hawaii's longline fishery this directive presents managers with a decision problem: How 
much should they restrain commercial fishing in order to protect endangered sea turtle 
populations?  I evaluate the fishery manager's decision using a Bayesian model of production, 
and Bayesian decision analysis. 
My approach proceeds in two steps.  First, I estimate a model of production, accounting 
for the joint production of desirable and undesirable outputs.  Then, using the estimated model 
parameters, I solve the social utility maximization problem facing decision-makers.  However, 
the solution relies on knowing the social value of sea turtle bycatch, which is not well known.  I 
therefore iterate over a wide range of possible social values and calculate the optimal 
regulation that maximizes the expected utility for each iteration.  This step, effectively reverse 
engineers the decision analysis.  Rather than choosing a decision to maximize expected utility 
given known social values, I calculate the optimal decision for every social value in a reasonable 
range. This iterative process results in a guide that maps the social value of sea turtles to 
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optimal sea turtle regulations.  I thereby uncover the implicit values regulators used to set 
observed regulations, assuming they were maximizing utility.   
This approach is based on statistical decision theory outlined by Berger (1985) and more 
recent work by Lin et al. (1999) and Gelman et al. (2013).  The general framework uses 
statistical inference to predict the quantities that enter into a specific decision problem.  For 
Hawaii’s regulatory decision problem, these quantities include the value of sea turtle protection 
and the value of restraining fishery production.  The approach is statistical in that the quantities 
may not be precisely measured, or the decision process may involve inherent uncertainty.  To 
solve the decision problem under uncertainty, a researcher numerically maximizes the 
expected utility over the set of possible decisions.  The utility function is assumed and 
represents the value of gains and losses resulting from a particular decision.  Although the 
decision is sensitive to the accuracy of the model and how utility is specified, decision analysis 
succeeds in making the values that enter the decision process transparent.  With regard to 
Coase’s regulatory framework, decision analysis provides a tool to solve decision problems 
where the optimal decision balances a tradeoff between damages from production, and 
damages to production from regulatory restraint. 
In order to fit the decision theory framework to evaluate sea turtle regulations I make 
several modifications.  I first address missing information on the value of sea turtles.  Sea turtles 
are a non-market good, therefore estimating the value of their protection is challenging.  To 
resolve this limitation, I modify the decision optimization problem.  I assume decision makers 
maximize utility when setting regulations, then iterate over a reasonable set of sea turtle values 
an solve for the level of regulatory protection that maximizes utility.  This process reverses 
traditional decision analysis, but similarly succeeds in making quantities transparent.   
The second modification addresses the infrequent rate of sea turtle bycatch events.  
Interacting with sea turtles is rare in Hawaii’s longline fishery, therefore a model of these 
events must account for over-dispersion.  One way to minimize bias when modeling rare events 
is to aggregate observations, in this case to the industry-level (Dixon et al. 2005, Kvamsdal et al. 
2013, and Martin et al. 2015).  I therefore specify a multilevel model of production with 
desirable fish catch predicted at the firm-level and undesirable sea turtle bycatch predicted at 
the industry-level.  These modifications allow me to evaluate the regulatory decision facing 
Hawaii’s fishery managers.  They also expand the range of decision problems for which decision 
analysis is useful.  The fishery problem shares many characteristics with other important 
industries, such as nuclear power generation, and offshore oil drilling.  In each of these 
industries, regulators must decide how much production to promote, when production carries 
the risk of severe environmental damage.  The modified decision analysis I develop can be 
extended to evaluate these decisions as well. 
I fit the model to unbalanced panel data from Hawaii’s longline fishery collected for 204 
vessels operating between 2004 and 2013.  These data consist of annual input and output levels 
for three categories of desirable fish catch observed at the firm-level.  Annual sea turtle 
interactions for two endangered species, loggerhead and leatherback sea turtles, are observed 
at the industry-level.  Estimates of production parameters, including technical and 
environmental efficiency, come from fitting a set of models using Bayesian inference.  I then 
conduct posterior predictive checks to verify that estimates match empirical observations.  
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Results from these checks provide confidence in the model estimates.  Numerical samples are 
then drawn from posterior densities to solve the decision analysis problem. 
I develop a set of statistical models and a decision analysis to evaluate the regulatory 
decision fishery managers must make to balance the commercial production of Hawaii’s 
longline fishery with endangered sea turtle protection.  Section 2 provides background on the 
fishery, describing the production process and pointing to key literature on the fishery which 
helps inform model parameterization.  Section 3 describes the data I use to estimate the model, 
and modifications I make to the raw data.  In Section 4, I develop a multioutput stochastic 
frontier model to capture the joint production of desirable outputs, a Poisson model of the 
production of undesirable outputs, and summarize the estimation results, and posterior 
predictive checks I use to evaluate model fit.  Section 5 presents the full Bayesian decision 
analysis and results. I conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of the model’s implications for the 
actual decision process, limitations of the current approach, and the relevance to other 
regulatory decision problems. 
 
2.2 Fishery Background 
 
Hawaii’s longline fishery provides an ideal context to examine regulatory decision 
making.  The fishery produces multiple species of desirable commercial catch, as well as 
undesirable bycatch.  The wide range of outputs is a result of the production technology 
employed by fishers.  Fishers harvest fish using longline gear, consisting of a mainline up to 100 
km long, suspended by floats, with baited hooks descending at regular intervals (Boggs et al. 
1993).  Together this fishing gear forms a set.  Fishers choose whether to target tuna or 
swordfish by placing the set deep in the water column to target tuna, or shallow to target 
swordfish.  Although tuna and swordfish are the primary target species, the fishing gear is not 
perfectly selective.  A total of 21 commercially managed species are caught using this gear.  The 
gear also interacts with undesirable species.  Endangered loggerhead and leatherback sea 
turtles are of primary concern, but sea birds and protected marine mammals are also at risk of 
being caught. 
Joint production of desirable, and undesirable outputs prompted regulators to 
intervene.  In 1999, the Western and Central Pacific Fishery Commission implemented an 
emergency closure of the entire fishery in response to concern over the level of sea turtle 
bycatch.  This was followed by a prolonged closure of the swordfish sector, which has the 
highest risk of sea turtle interactions, from 2002 through the end of 2003.  In 2004, the 
swordfish sector was reopened with new gear restrictions, mandated federal observers, and 
annual sea turtle interaction limits set to 17 loggerhead and 16 leatherback sea turtles.  As a 
result of these limits, the swordfish sector closed early in 2006, and again in 2011.  Sea turtle 
limits were then relaxed in 2012 to allow 34 loggerhead and 26 leatherback interactions, and 
has remained open. 
The fishery has been the subject of extensive research, and as a result has a well-
documented history (Pooley 1993) creating a rich literature from which to build.  The most 
relevant information includes results from a previous evaluation of Hawaii’s production 
efficiency, and a series of papers estimating the value or cost of sea turtle bycatch.  The 
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production efficiency of Hawaii’s longline fleet was estimated by Sharma et al. (1998).  They 
evaluated each fisher’s efficiency relative to an estimated ideal production technology, and 
found the average efficiency of the fleet is 84%.  This will serve as a prior for estimating the 
model developed in the Section 4. 
Following the initial closure of the swordfish sector, a series of papers estimated the 
impact of sea turtle bycatch regulations using a variety of modeling approaches.  The first 
assessment of Hawaii’s sea turtle regulations was published shortly after the first temporary 
closure in 1999 by Curtis et al. (2000).  The authors use a random utility model, and estimate 
the cost of reducing sea turtle bycatch to be $52,976 per turtle, or $41,262 per turtle if tuna 
fishing is exempted from the regulatory closure.  Several subsequent papers use a 
mathematical programming approach to estimate the shadow value of sea turtle bycatch.  
Pradhan et al. (2006) estimate the shadow value in terms of lost revenue as $56,060, and in a 
later paper incorporating spatial and seasonal dimensions, they estimate a larger shadow value 
of $60,908 (Pradhan et al. 2008).  Finally, Huang et al. (2007) use a directional distance function 
approach to estimate the shadow price of sea turtle bycatch to be $30,873.  Results from this 
literature will serve as a comparison to the results generated using a Bayesian decision analysis.  
Comparing these two types of estimate for sea turtle values reveals a clear difference in 
methodology.  Values obtained from Bayesian decision analysis measure the implicit social 
value of a sea turtle conditional on the level of sea turtle protection, whereas the shadow price 
of sea turtles reflects the change in revenue or profit from relaxing the sea turtle constraint by 
1 turtle. 
 
2.3 Data 
 
I draw on three data sources to develop two panels of fishery observations from 2004 to 
2013.  Federal observer data counts the number of sea turtle bycatch events.  Logbook data 
records the start and end date for each fishing trip, and the time and date for each set deployed 
during the trip.  Dealer data records the pounds sold and the price per pound for each 
commercial species landed at the Honolulu fish auction at the end of each trip.  Nearly all 
landings from Hawaii’s longline fleet are sold at the Honolulu fish auction.  The sample period is 
restricted by data availability.  Federal observers began data collection in 2004 as part of the 
regulations reopening swordfish fishing, and my access to logbook and dealer data only 
includes observations through 2013.  This sample period, however, includes the first 10 years 
under which the fishery was regulated by annual sea turtle bycatch limits. 
The two panels summarize data at two levels: firm-level and industry-level.  The firm-
level panel measures annual fisher activity through a set of inputs and outputs, where the unit 
of observation is fisher ! in year _.  To generate the firm-level panel I first combine logbook and 
dealer data, matching on vessel name and landing date.  This results in a set observations from 
each trip taken by each vessel over the sample period. Using the logbook data, I define a new 
variable for set type, which takes the value of either deep set, or shallow set based on the time 
the set was deployed.  Regulations require that shallow sets be deployed at night.  I then 
calculate trip duration from the recorded departure date and return date, and define this as a 
new variable.  Using the dealer data, I aggregate fish catch into three categories: bigeye tuna, 
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swordfish, and other.  For each category, I sum the total pounds landed each trip, and record 
the average price per pound.  Because fishers take several trips in a year, I sum fishing duration, 
number of each set type, and catch for each vessel each year creating a panel of annual inputs 
and outputs for 204 vessels operating from 2004 to 2013.   
The industry-level panel summarizes the number of sea turtle bycatch events observed 
each year.  Although I treat these observations as industry-wide, they are in fact limited to 
observations from Federal observers aboard vessels targeting swordfish.  Trips that target tuna 
are not subject to 100% observer coverage.  Because of the overlap between shallow set gear 
and sea turtle habitat, swordfish trips are much more likely to interact with sea turtles, 
therefore, the assumption that these observations measure sea turtle bycatch across the entire 
industry is reasonable.  For the sample period 2004-2013, I use publicly available annual sea 
turtle bycatch counts for loggerhead and leatherback sea turtles.  In 2006 and 2011, these 
counts reflect binding sea turtle regulations forcing the shallow set sector to close prematurely. 
 
2.4 Models 
 
The goal of the following models is to represent the production decisions of fishers in 
Hawaii’s longline fishery and estimate the production processes by which outputs are 
generated.  This includes estimating both the productivity of the fishing technology, and the 
technical and environmental efficiency when fishers use this technology to produce desirable 
and undesirable outputs.  In this section, I introduce the stochastic frontier framework, and 
develop a set of models for the production of multiple desirable and undesirable outputs in 
Hawaii’s longline fishery. 
 
2.4.1 Multioutput Stochastic Frontier Model 
 
Stochastic frontier models were first developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen et 
al. (1977) to estimate the technical efficiency of individual firms using a common production 
technology.  Efficiency was measured as a percentage of the estimated ideal production level 
conditional on input decisions.  The advantage of their approach over alternative mathematical 
programming methods (DEA), was the inclusion of a stochastic error component.  This 
accounted for measurement error and variation in production technology.   Firm-specific 
efficiency could then be identified by specifying an additional one-sided error term.   
To illustrate, imagine a set of t firms. The stochastic error term is defined as u, and 
assumed to follow a normal distribution.  Firm-specific efficiencies are defined R%, and given 
strictly positive distributions, typically a half-normal, exponential, or gamma distribution.  Then, 
given a set of firm !'s input decisions, vw, and production function x(vw), firm !'s output $%  is 
modeled by the following:   
 $% = x(vw) exp(−R%) exp(u) 1 
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By log transforming both sides, the model becomes linearized, and model parameters, including 
firm-specific technical efficiencies, R%, can be estimated using least squares, maximum 
likelihood, or Bayesian estimators (Green 2003).   
Stochastic frontier modeling has proved useful for identifying the various components 
contributing to variation in productivity among firms and across time.  In addition to variation in 
technology and scale of production, the stochastic frontier model estimates firm-specific 
operating efficiency.  The combination of these parameters in a single model creates a 
meaningful description of firm-specific production in an industry. 
In the simplest formulation, the model is limited to production of a single desirable 
output.  More recent literature has extended the framework to production of multiple outputs.  
Building on the Bayesian estimation procedure, Fernandez et al. (2000) accommodate multiple 
output technologies using an output transformation function. The function aggregates a {-
dimensional output vector, |%, as a univariate parameter }%, given by the following function: 
 
}% = *+)-~$%,-~I-m 2
m ~Ä 2 
 
where )-provides a scale adjustment for individual outputs, and = defines the elasticity of 
transformation between outputs, which determines the curvature of the production 
equivalence surface.  For = > 1 the production equivalence is concave, and for = < 1 it is 
convex.  The transformation }%  is then substituted for $%  in the original stochastic frontier 
model to estimate technical efficiency for firms jointly producing multiple outputs. 
 I modify the previously developed multioutput stochastic frontier framework to model 
desirable outputs in Hawaii's longline fleet.  Recall the stochastic frontier model defines the 
level of output, $%,Ñ, as a function of inputs, x.vw,Ö0, firm efficiencies, R%, and stochastic error, u, 
as given below. 
 $%,Ñ = x.vw,Ö0 exp(−R%) exp(u) 3 
 
After log transforming both sides, I can write the model, assuming a random normal standard 
deviation =á as 
 log.}%,Ñ0 ~Nçlog çx.vw,Ö0é − R%, =áié . 4 
 
For fisher ! operating in year _, the fisher chooses a ê-dimensional vector of inputs, denoted v%,Ñ, which are then transformed into a {-dimensional vector of desirable commercial catch, |%,Ñ.  I aggregate the vector of desirable outputs using the following specification of }%,Ñ: 
 }%,Ñ = *+$%,Ñ,-I-m 2 . 5 
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I drop the scale adjustment term from Fernandez et al. (2000) because all outputs are 
measured in pounds.  I also drop the elasticity of transformation term to simplify disaggregation 
of individual outputs using a beta regression, which I discuss in Section 4.3.   
I assume fishers produce desirable outputs using the following constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production technology: 
 
x.vw,Ö0 = ) *+,í/%,Ñ,-1í-m 2
m 1Ä 6 
 
 
where ) is the factor productivity, ,í  is the input share parameter where î is the number of 
production inputs, and 4 is the elasticity of input substitution.  The sum of the ,í 's is 
constrained to equal 1, and serves to scale inputs measured in different units (days and number 
of sets).  To guarantee this condition is met I use the following parameterization developed by 
Gelman et al. (1996) for fractional parameters that sum to 1: 
 ,- = exp.ï-0∑ exp(ï7)í7m , for	# = 1,… , î. 7 
 
This specification allows each input share parameter to be defined by ï-, which can take a 
proper normal prior. 
 I define vessel-specific technical inefficiency as R%, which I assume is exponential with a 
prior of 84%, based on earlier efficiency results from Sharma et al. (1998).  I assume these 
inefficiencies are constant over time, which is a reasonable assumption given the 10-year 
period of observations.  This implies that any year to year variation in a vessel’s production, 
beyond that explained by input decisions, is captured as a normal stochastic shock. 
 
2.4.2 Poisson Model for Undesirable Outputs 
 
Sea turtle interactions for each species ^ ∈ {loggerhead, leatherback} are observed 
each year _ at the industry-level.  I model the annual number of sea turtle interactions, £@,Ñ, as a 
truncated Poisson distribution, where §Ñ  is the upper truncation point defined by the observed 
turtle interaction limit in year _.  The model can be written as 
  
Pr.£@Ñ|ß, /%,Ñ,@®©™™9´	@CÑ@ , £@Ñ ≤ §Ñ0 = aí¨ldî!¨ld ∑ a%!!ÆØ%∞ , 8 
 
where the numerator is the PMF of the Poisson distribution and the denominator is the CDF at 
the truncation point §Ñ.  Modeling sea turtle interactions in this way guarantees a policy 
 18 
invariant parameter estimate of	ß.  I parameterize the Poisson≥¥µ∂∑ model in terms of rate and 
exposure (Gelman et al. 2013).  Although more commonly used in epidemiological studies, 
when applied to production of undesirable outputs, I interpret the rate parameter, ß, as 
industry-level environmental inefficiency.  I model exposure using only shallow sets, /%,Ñ,@®©™™9´	@CÑ@ because they generate nearly all observed sea turtle interaction events.  I 
assume environmental inefficiency is constant over time, and identical for loggerhead and 
leatherback sea turtle interactions.  This assumption implies the two sea turtle populations are 
identical and independent.  In the current study, I lack sufficient data to separately identify the 
model for each sea turtle species, however, regulations are defined for the two populations 
separately, so I proceed assuming two identical and independent sea turtle populations. 
 
2.4.3 Zero-Inflated Beta Regression Models for Output Share 
 
In order to accurately assign market prices to predictions of aggregate output, }%,Ñ, and 
calculate the benefits of fishery production in the Bayesian decision analysis, the model must 
disaggregate }%,Ñ  into individual outputs for bigeye tuna, swordfish, and other desirable species.  
I accomplish this by transforming observed outputs into two parameters representing the share 
of output that is bigeye tuna, and the share of output that is swordfish.  I then model these 
using a zero-inflated beta regression (Ospina and Ferrari 2010).  Below, I define the share of 
aggregate output that is bigeye tuna for each vessel ! in year _ as ∏m,%,Ñ, and the share of 
remaining output that is swordfish as ∏i,%,Ñ.   
 ∏m,%,Ñ = $πH,%,Ñ$πH,%,Ñ + $FG,%,Ñ + $JÑ®C',%,Ñ , 9 ∏i,%,Ñ = $FG,%,Ñ$FG,%,Ñ + $JÑ®C',%,Ñ . 10 
 
Using a zero-inflated beta regression has several advantages.  I can model the relationship 
between output shares and the share of inputs that are shallow sets, which I define as º%,Ñ =/%,Ñ,@®©™™9´	@CÑ@ (/%,Ñ,@®©™™9´	@CÑ@ + /%,Ñ,ÆCCD	@CÑ@)⁄  for each vessel ! in year _.  By setting up the 
model in this way, I estimate an aggregate relationship between fishers’ decisions of what to 
target and what they end up catching.  Because fishing is inherently stochastic, this model 
accounts for uncertainty in catch composition.  The zero-inflated beta regression employs a 
mixed beta-Bernoulli distribution to model shares that can equal 0, despite 0 being outside the 
support of the beta distribution.  As applied to ∏m and ∏i, the two models can be written as 
 Pr.∏m,%,Ñæøm, ¿m,%,Ñ, ¡m0 = ¬ Bernoulli(øm), if	∏m,%,Ñ = 0beta.¿m,%,Ñ¡m, .1 − ¿m,%,Ñ0¡m0, otherwise, 11 Pr.∏i,%,Ñæøi, ¿i,%,Ñ , ¡i0 = ¬ Bernoulli(øi), if	∏i,%,Ñ = 0beta.¿i,%,Ñ¡i, .1 − ¿i,%,Ñ0¡i0, otherwise , 12 
 
where øm and øi represent the probability of that ∏m,%,Ñ  and ∏i,%,Ñ are 0 respectively.  The beta 
distributions are parameterized in terms of observed means ¿m,%,Ñ and ¿i,%,Ñ for each vessel each 
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year, which are modeled as a function of the input share and average correlation parameter, 
and variances ¡m and ¡i.  Each mean is defined as 
 ¿m,%,Ñ = exp.∆mº%,Ñ01 + exp.∆mº%,Ñ0 , 13 ¿i,%,Ñ = exp.∆iº%,Ñ01 + exp.∆iº%,Ñ0 , 14 
 
which is the inverse logit of ∆mº%,Ñ  and ∆iº%,Ñ, where ∆m and ∆i define the average relationship 
between º%,Ñ and ∏m,%,Ñ and ∏i,%,Ñ  respectively. 
 
2.4.4 Estimation Results 
 
Table 1 shows parameter estimates from the model fit to vessel-level data on annual 
inputs and outputs from 2004 to 2013, and industry-level data on observed sea turtle 
interactions from 2004 to 2013.  I fit the model using Bayesian techniques implemented in Stan 
(Carpenter et al. 2017).  Approximate convergence («» < 1.1, Gelman et al. 2013) is achieved 
running four parallel Hamiltonian Monte Carlo chains for 1000 iterations each, discarding the 
first 500 samples in each chain.  Posterior estimates are therefore calculated using 2000 
samples from the posterior distribution.  Figure 1 displays the sampling progression for nine of 
the model parameters.  Sampling chains mix, and achieve convergence before the first 250 
iterations, well before the end of the warmup. 
The common production technology for desirable outputs is defined by the parameter 
estimates	), ,m, ,i, and 4.  The productivity scalar, ), translates input decision levels to output 
quantities which explains the large estimate.  The input share estimate for shallow sets, ,i, is 
almost twice as large as the estimate for deep sets, ,m.  This result is expected given trips 
dominated by shallow sets typically land more pounds of fish. The input elasticity of 
substitution, 4, is estimated to be slightly greater than 1, which suggests deep sets and shallow 
sets are very slight complements, and fishers have a slight preference to mix inputs.  The 
random standard deviation, =á, is estimated in log scale, and therefore, quite large.  This 
indicates substantial unexplained variation in desirable catch levels, which is expected given 
fishery production is driven by many factors beyond the control of fishers, including sea surface 
weather, fish movement, and oceanographic factors.  Undesirable outputs are predicted using 
the environmental efficiency parameter, which I estimate to be very small, in line with the prior 
beliefs that sea turtle interactions are rare events. 
For both beta regression models the probability of the share being 0 is low, øm and øi, 
indicating that vessels are likely to catch at least some bigeye tuna or swordfish each year.  For 
those vessels that catch at least some bigeye tuna or swordfish, coefficients from the beta 
regressions indicate that the proportion of annual inputs that are deep sets is positively related 
with the proportion of aggregate output that is bigeye tuna, ∆m, and strongly negatively related 
to the proportion of the remaining output that is swordfish, ∆i.  These results suggest that 
deploying more deep sets are likely to catch mostly bigeye tuna and other desirable fish, while 
those deploying mostly shallow sets are likely to catch a mix of swordfish, bigeye tuna, and 
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other desirable fish.  The estimate of variance is larger for the beta regression predicting the 
share of remaining catch that is swordfish suggesting large unexplained variation in the share of 
swordfish and share of other desirable fish. 
Figure 2 shows estimates of each vessel’s technical efficiency.  Vessels are ranked from 
most efficient to least efficient.  This technical efficiency parameter is critical for modeling 
production at the vessel level because it accounts for heterogeneity in the production process 
between firms.  Results indicate a fairly continuous distribution of vessels from the most 
technical efficient, close to 100%, to approximately 60%, with few gaps or clusters.  Vessels 
below 60% technical efficiency decrease at a faster rate, with the lowest vessels operating 
below 50% technical efficiency. 
 
2.4.5 Model Checking 
 
I assess the fit of the model to the data using a series of posterior predictive checks.  
These checks compare simulated posterior predictions to observed data.  I focus the posterior 
predictive checks to those quantities that directly enter the expected utility optimization: 
annual bigeye tuna, swordfish and other desirable species catch, and total annual Loggerhead 
and Leatherback sea turtle interactions.  Figure 3 presents posterior predictions in green, and 
observed data in grey by year and output type.  Posterior predictions for the three desirable 
species groups are summarized as annual expected catch for each vessel.  For bigeye tuna and 
other desirable species there is substantial overlap between the distribution of predicted and 
observed annual vessel catch.  For all years, the model tends to overpredict swordfish catch for 
vessels that catch very little swordfish, and underpredict swordfish catch for vessels that catch 
extremely large amounts of swordfish.  This result is due to the large estimated variance 
parameter ¡i, in the beta regression predicting the proportion of swordfish in the remaining 
aggregated catch.  The misalignment between predictions and observations would be a greater 
concern if vessel level catch was used in the expected utility calculation to generate the main 
result of this paper, however, once aggregated the over and underpredictions compensate for 
each other.  Posterior predictive checks of loggerhead and leatherback interactions are at the 
industry-level therefore posterior predictions are illustrated using all 2000 posterior draws. 
Because the model assumes identical interactions rates for loggerhead and leatherback sea 
turtles, posterior predictions are created from the same generative model.  Each year, only one 
interaction level is observed for the entire industry, illustrated with a vertical grey line.  In 2004, 
the industry deployed very few shallow sets as a result of reopening the fishery after a 
prolonged closure, therefore predicted interactions and observed interactions are both very 
small.  For the remaining years, posterior predictions approximate observed interaction levels.  
Observations that lie in the extreme tails of the predicted interactions are balanced with 4 
observed on the extreme right tail, and 3 observed on the extreme left tail.  On the whole, the 
model fits the observed aggregate outputs fairly well. 
 
2.5 Bayesian Decision Analysis 
 
 21 
 In this section I detail the steps for evaluating the decision analysis component of the 
model.  The following outline summarizes the procedure. 
1. Define the realistic set of decision outcomes. 
2. Calculate the expected level of desirable and undesirable outputs for each element in 
the decision set using posterior predictions. 
3. Define a sufficiently wide range of possible sea turtle values. 
4. Finally, iterate over the range of defined sea turtle values and maximize the expected 
utility each iteration by finding the optimal decision level. 
Fishery managers decide on the annual limit of loggerhead and leatherback sea turtles. I 
denote a particular decision §, and the set of all possible decisions …. Given observed decision 
levels, I constrain … to the set {1, 2, 3, … , 50}.  The set is restricted to feasible decision levels 
which reduces the time to evaluate a full Bayesian decision analysis. 
The next step is to estimate the expected fishery outputs conditional on §.  I accomplish 
this using the following procedure.  I first draw the annual number of shallow sets for each 
vessel !, /%,@®©™™9´	@CÑ@'CD , from a truncated normal distribution with mean and standard deviation 
equal to the observed mean and standard deviation for that vessel.  I then draw an annual 
number of sea turtle interactions, £'CD, from Eq 8, using posterior parameter estimates for ß.  If £'CD ≤ §, the sample of /%,@®©™™9´	@CÑ@'CD  are passed through to the next step.  If £'CD > §, then 
new samples of /%,@®©™™9´	@CÑ@'CD  are drawn, multiplying the mean of each truncated normal 
distribution by 51 52⁄ , representing a reduction in season length by 1 week.  As long as £'CD >§, the mean of each truncated normal distribution is multiplied by further 1-week reductions in 
season length, returning to 51 52⁄  after 1 52⁄  is reached.  Cycling through season length serves 
two purposes.  It speeds up sampling for very restrictive levels of §, and it captures the impact 
of those decision levels on fishing season length.  I approximate the Ε(£'CD|§) by taking the 
mean over all 2000 posterior parameter draws. 
 Once the condition is met that £'CD ≤ §, the sample of /%,@®©™™9´	@CÑ@'CD  is used to estimate 
the desirable fish catch for each vessel.  Because sea turtle interaction limits only apply to the 
shallow set sector of the fishery, I assume the number of deep sets is unchanged by the 
decision level.  Therefore, for each vessel !, the annual number of deep sets /%,ÆCCD	@CÑ@'CD , is set to 
the observed mean for that vessel over the entire sample period.  Again, using posterior 
parameter estimates, I draw an aggregated desirable output level }%  using Eq 4.  Separate 
output levels for bigeye tuna, $%,πH'CD , are estimated by multiplying }%  by the predicted output 
share parameter ∏À,w and ∏Ã,w drawn from Eq 11 and Eq 12 using annual input levels from the 
previous procedure.  Similarly, $%,FG'CD is estimated by multiplying }% − $%,πH'CD  by ∏Ã,w, with the 
remainder attributed to $%,JÑ®C''CD .  I then approximate Ε.$πH'CD|§0, Ε.$FG'CD|§0, and Ε.$JÑ®C''CD |§0 by 
aggregating individual vessel catch and taking the mean over all 2000 posterior parameter 
draws. 
 Finally, I use the quantities Ε($'CD|§) and Ε(£'CD|§) to optimize the following expected 
utility problem. 
 maxÆ ç?πHΕ.$πH'CDæ§0 + ?FGΕ.$FG'CDæ§0 + ?JÑ®C'Ε.$JÑ®C''CD æ§0é − ?B Ε(£'CD|§) 15 
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The price of desirable outputs is calculated as the mean observed market price over the sample 
period, adjusted for inflation.  These calculations correspond to ?πH = $3.95, ?FG = $3.14, and ?JÑ®C' = $2.12.  The value of sea turtles, ?B , is not observed, therefore the optimization 
problem is solved iteratively by substituting in values for ?B  from the set {$1000, $2000, $3000,… , $30,000,000}. 
 The optimum is analytically solved by setting the first order condition of Eq 15 equal to 
0.  Rearranging the first order condition gives 
 ?πH ŒŒ§ Ε.$πH'CDæ§0 + ?FG ŒŒ§ Ε.$FG'CDæ§0 + ?JÑ®C' ŒŒ§ Ε.$JÑ®C''CD æ§0 = 	?B ŒŒ§ Ε(£'CD|§). 16 
 
This defines the decision level at which the marginal benefits from fishery production (left-hand 
side) equal the marginal costs from sea turtle bycatch (right-hand side).  The optimal decision 
level will vary depending on the value of sea turtles assumed.  Plotting the range of sea turtle 
values and the corresponding optimal regulatory level visualizes the social demand for sea 
turtle regulation. 
 
4.5.1 Decision Analysis Results 
 
 Figure 4 displays the optimal decision level over the set of simulated sea turtle values, 
and corresponding expected number of sea turtle interactions and expected total desirable 
catch.  These expected quantities incorporate the effects of parameter uncertainty from model 
estimates, and uncertainty in the underlying data generating process through standard 
deviation in the desirable outputs model, and the shape of the Poisson distribution of sea turtle 
interactions.  Panel A in Figure 4 displays the optimal decision level over the set of simulated 
sea turtle values. Panel B and C show the expected turtle interactions and desirable output 
levels that went in to the expected utility maximization.  Reducing the decision level below 15 
sea turtles per year increases likelihood the policy will be binding, thereby reducing the 
expected number of sea turtle interactions, and the expected desirable fish catch, reflecting the 
impact of shallow set fishery closure. This accounts for the trade-off modeled in the expected 
utility maximization. 
 The decision levels implemented from 2004 to 2009 implied a social value of 
loggerheads in the range of $4.58 million-$4.60 million, and leatherbacks in the range of $4.60 
million-$4.63 million.  As decision levels are relaxed, the implied social value of sea turtles 
asymptotes just below $5 million.  More restrictive decision levels quickly increase the implied 
social value of sea turtles.  For instance, setting the annual sea turtle interaction limit to 5 is 
only optimal if the social value of sea turtles lies between about approximately $9 million and 
$12 million.  Setting the decision level to 1 per year is only optimal above $26 million. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
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 My results illustrate the use of Bayesian decision analysis to create a guide for 
regulators who must balance desirable fish production and damaging sea turtle bycatch.  The 
framework I develop uncovers the implicit value of fishery damages to sea turtles that would 
make each decision level optimal.  This information is critically important as it helps regulators 
assess the social values implied by their decisions.  It does not, however, prescribe an optimal 
decision level.  Rather, it serves as a common framework to facilitate stakeholder debate and 
build consensus around the social value of fishery damages.  Once consensus is reached, 
regulators can use the model to map that value to the optimal decision level. 
The approach is sufficiently general to serve regulators in other industries that jointly 
produce desirable and undesirable outputs.  Regulators need only re-specify two key features: 
1) a statistical model for production of desirable and undesirable outputs, and 2) an expected 
utility maximization of net social benefits resulting from production.  The statistical model of 
production should capture the important input decisions made by firms in the industry, as well 
as describe how firm’s desirable production contributes to the joint undesirable production of 
damages.  The expected utility function must account for relevant quantities that make up the 
social benefits and costs of industry production, with expectations estimated for those 
quantities where uncertainty is important.  
Under the specification assumptions used to model Hawaii’s longline fishery, the results 
indicate observed sea turtle regulations imply large social values for damages caused by sea 
turtle bycatch. Under the regulations in place from 2004 to 2009 annual interactions limits were 
set to 16 for leatherback sea turtles and 17 for loggerhead sea turtles.  Under these regulations, 
the expected desirable fish catch is estimated at 13.74 million pounds and 13.75 million pounds 
respectively, and the expected number of sea turtle interactions estimated as 9.72 and 9.78 
respectively.  Assuming these regulations optimized social net benefit, they implied social 
values for sea turtle bycatch of $5.1 million per leatherback, and $4.9 million per loggerhead 
caught.  Further tightening these regulations would imply larger values.  For instance, setting 
the annual sea turtle interaction limit to 5, implies a social value of sea turtle bycatch in the 
range of $8.9-10.6 million.  At sufficiently high social values for sea turtles, greater than $30 
million per sea turtle, the optimal regulation approaches fishery closure. 
Moving in the other direction, more relaxed regulations imply lower social values for sea 
turtle bycatch.  In 2012, sea turtle interaction limits were relaxed to allow for 24 leatherbacks 
and 34 loggerheads, the decision level moved toward asymptotic convergence.   For limits 
greater than 20, the expected number of sea turtle interactions, and the expected desirable 
catch does not change very much.  This reflects that the small probability of these regulations 
binding.  For instance, the probability of fishery closure under the limit of 24 leatherbacks is 
0.00001.  Moving down the asymptotic tail, smaller sea turtle values very quickly relax the 
optimal decision level. If regulations confer some fixed cost to society, regardless of the 
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likelihood they bind, this would suggest it becomes optimal to remove regulations below the 
asymptotic convergence value of approximately $5 million.  
Any specific policy recommendations are conditional on knowing, or accurately 
estimating, the social value of sea turtle bycatch.  Even without this information, the framework 
can still guide regulators in evaluating their decisions.  For instance, results suggest that the 
current levels of sea turtle interaction limits are unlikely to bind.  Therefore, regulators should 
consider abandoning bycatch regulations if they determine the values implied by their current 
decision reflect social norms.  Similarly, tightening regulations beyond the 2004-2009 levels 
would not be optimal except under very large social values for sea turtle bycatch.  In this way, 
the model can guide regulators through decision space, and indicate the region that is likely to 
achieve optimal net social benefits. 
However, decision makers may be bound by constraints beyond the model’s assumption 
that they maximize net social benefit.  Regulations of sea turtle interactions are in fact 
legislated by the Endangered Species Act, which requires a biological opinion before an annual 
sea turtle interaction limit is adopted.  Explicitly, the regulations are in place to ensure the long-
term protection of endangered species.  The published rational for a given decision level is 
therefore tied to the biological opinion, and not directly linked to any effects on net social 
benefit.  That said, this model provides information on cases when there is misalignment 
between the two objectives.  Or, there may be possible refinements that achieve greater net 
social benefits within the constraint that they protect species’ viability. 
The discussion above, of course, is contingent on having an accurate model of fishery 
production in Hawaii.  Initial evaluations using posterior predictive checks (Figure 2) suggest 
that the model achieves a reasonably good fit to available data.  Ultimate evaluation of the 
model should be based on whether or not the predicted quantities seem reasonable.  But 
model results are also derived from a crucial set of assumptions. First, I assume fishers won’t 
respond to policy levels in a way that changers the production technology.  This could affect the 
results in two ways:  When regulations are tightened fishers have strong incentives to improve 
their environmental efficiency.  When regulations are relaxed, the opposite may occur, and 
fishers may adopt more damaging production practices.  I also assume that technical efficiency 
estimates for individual firms are fixed through time.  Finally, I assume a constant average price 
for the three fish types.  In reality, these may be subject to exogenous shocks, or endogenous 
supply decisions. 
 
2.6.1 Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, I have shown how Bayesian decision analysis can be used to evaluate 
regulatory trade-offs by uncovering the implicit value of damages generated by production.  
This analysis provides regulators with an optimal decision guide given information on the social 
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value of damages.  Although regulators might be well positioned to approximate this value 
through discussion with stakeholders, future empirical work could incorporate existing non-
market valuation data to rigorously estimate the social value of damages.  Combining these 
results would further expand the information set available to regulators, and increase the 
likelihood that regulations maximize net social benefits. 
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3. ANALYZING TUNA FISHER LABOR SUPPLY DECISIONS BY 
DECOMPOSING WAGE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 One of the fundamental pursuits of labor economics is to understand how people 
decide to allocate their time.  Because time is a finite resource, factors that affect the amount 
of time people work, will also impact the amount of time remaining for other activities.  In 
particular, labor economists have focused their attention on understanding how wage affects 
the amount of time people work.  This is known as the labor supply decision. 
Two competing theoretical models have been proposed to describe labor supply 
decisions.  Under the neoclassical model, laborers maximize utility by allocating time to leisure 
and labor activities.  When laborers experience positive transitory wage shocks, the substitution 
effect dominates the income effect, and the model predicts laborers will increase their utility by 
substituting leisure for labor, thereby increasing labor supply.  Alternatively, under the target 
revenue model, laborers work until they achieve an existing income target.  With positive 
transitory wage shocks, laborers are able to achieve their income target more quickly, and 
therefore reduce their labor supply.  The applicability of these competing theories hinges on 
whether laborers increase or decrease their labor supply in response to transitory wage shocks. 
 To empirically evaluate these predictions, studies have sought labor contexts with 
frequent transitory wage shocks, and autonomous labor supply decisions.  The results of these 
studies, however, have been mixed.  Early studies of New York City and Singapore taxi cab 
drivers found large negative wage elasticities of labor supply, supporting a revenue target 
model (Camerer et al. 1997, Chou 2002).  Similar results in support of the target revenue model 
were also found in scallop and tuna fisheries (Gautam et al. 1996, Nguyen and Leung 2013).  
Follow up work, however, on New York City taxi cab drivers noted a negative estimation bias 
with earlier measures of hourly wage.  Once corrected, cab drivers appeared to follow 
neoclassical stopping behavior rather than targeting revenue (Farber 2005, 2008).  Other 
studies of stadium vendors (Oettinger 1999), bike messengers (Fehr and Goette 2007), and 
lobster fishers (Stafford 2015) found substantial positive wage elasticities of labor supply, 
supporting the neoclassical model. 
Much of the previous literature on labor supply assumes laborers respond directly to 
shocks in hourly or daily wage.  As noted earlier by Farber (2005), hourly or daily wage, 
however, may not be the most salient factor to which laborers adjust the amount of time they 
work.  In interviews with taxi cab drivers, he found fatigue was more often stated as the reason 
cab drivers stopped working. 
In this article, I follow a similar line of inquiry as Farber (2005) and investigate whether 
laborers adjust the amount of time they work in response, not to daily wage, but to shocks to 
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the components of wage.  In particular, I decompose daily wage into a price and quantity 
component.  The quantity component represents the part of a laborers’ wage generated by the 
amount of service they sell, while the price component represents the price they receive for 
their service.  One challenge with this line of inquiry is that in many contexts the price 
component is fixed, and hourly or daily quantities are rarely observed.7  Hawaii’s longline tuna 
fishery, however, provides an ideal context to investigate laborers response to the individual 
components of daily wage.  Not only do tuna fishers make autonomous labor supply decisions, 
deciding how long to stay at sea each trip, but they are also subject to price shocks in the 
market, as well as quantity shocks while fishing, both of which are observed. 
Using data from Hawaii’s longline tuna fishery, I first model trip length conditional on 
daily revenue, following previous studies.  I then decompose daily revenue into its components 
and model trip length using a Poisson regression.  In addition to generating insight into the 
labor supply response to price and quantity shocks, the Poisson model also addresses statistical 
issues resulting from modeling a strictly positive count process with a log-linear normal 
regression.  Because elasticities are not directly estimated in the nonlinear Poisson model, I 
compute them using posterior predictions to compare estimated elasticities of labor supply. 
The result from the log-linear model with wage measured as daily revenue is similar to 
previous findings suggesting laborers more closely follow a target revenue model, with an 
estimated wage elasticity of labor supply of -0.05.  After decomposing wage, I find that laborers 
respond differently to shocks to the price and quantity components of their daily revenue 
stream.  With respect to price shocks alone, I estimate a slight positive price elasticity of labor 
supply, indicating laborers follow neoclassical predictions and work more when the price 
component of their wage increases.  Interestingly, laborers respond in the opposite way to 
quantity shocks.  I estimate a larger and negative quantity elasticity of labor supply, suggesting 
laborers work less when their wages increase as a result of higher quantities.  Taken together 
these results indicate the response of laborers to wage shocks depends on the source of the 
shock. As the labor supply literature continues to develop, this appears to be an interesting 
direction of inquiry that may help resolve the conflicting predictions of the neoclassical and 
target revenue theories of labor supply. 
To provide context for these results, I describe the fishery and the key labor decisions in 
Section 2.  In Section 3 I document the data sources, and the decisions I make to prepare the 
data for model fitting.  I present the models and results in Sections 4 and 5 and discuss the 
relevance of my findings in Section 6.  
 
3.2 Background on Hawai`i’s Longline Fishery 
 
                                                        
7 For instance, taxi cab drivers have a fixed price per mile they drive, and stadium vendors sell merchandise for a 
set price. 
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 Hawaii’s longline fishery is the largest commercial fishery in Hawaii, operating in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) and Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO).  The fishery 
primarily targets bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) and swordfish (Xiphias gladius) generating an 
average annual revenue of $67.7 million, and landing on average 19.8 million pounds of fish 
annually between 2004 and 2013.  Over this period, bigeye tuna has become the dominant 
sector of the fishery associated with 66% of total revenue and 51% of total landings. 
 Fish are caught using longline fishing technology, which consists of strings of baited 
hooks attached to a primary longline extending up to 100 km.  Fishers choose between 
targeting tuna or swordfish by floating baited hooks at different depths.  Swordfish are targeted 
by setting gear between 70 and 100 feet below the surface, while tuna are targeted much 
deeper, between 200 and 1200 feet below the surface.  In addition to set depth, set location 
also varies depending on the target.  Swordfish trips tend to fish farther north and east in the 
Pacific.  As a result, the average trip length for trips targeting swordfish is 31 days, compared 
with trips targeting tuna that average 21 days.  Because tuna dominates the fishery and 
operates distinct gear settings in separate locations, I focus on the commercial tuna sector for 
this study. 
Entry into the fishery is limited by the availability of permits.  A total of 164 permits are 
issued by NOAA to vessels for commercial longline fishing.  Permits are freely transferable 
between vessels, so over time, the total number of vessels operating may exceed 164.  In 
addition to holding a valid permit, tuna fishers are required to fill out logbook forms, and are 
regulated by annual catch limits for bigeye tuna set each year in the WCPO and EPO.  Between 
2004 and 2013 the tuna fishery was forced to closed twice, in 2009 and 2010, after reaching the 
annual catch limit of 3,763 mt in the WCPO (Pan 2014). 
Vessels vary in length, hold size, and storage technology, but are typically operated by a 
captain and around 3 crew.  Once at sea, captains decide where to fish and how many days to 
stay out.  Although there are no restrictions on how long vessels stay at sea, most vessels land 
before they hit their maximum capacity.  Upon returning, vessels land their catch at the 
Honolulu fish auction, where fish are auctioned individually to a set of wholesalers who 
participate in a competitive bidding process.  Prices vary from fish to fish and are a function of 
quality, supply, and demand.  A vessel’s daily revenue is therefore determined by how much 
they catch each day fishing, and the prices they receive once they land. 
 
3.3 Data 
 
 Vessel captains are required to fill out logbook forms for every fishing trip they operate.  
On these forms they record the vessel name, permit number, commercial license, target 
species, departure date, return date, the date, time and location of each set they deploy, 
including the total number of hooks, and catch from each set.  Once vessels land their catch at 
 29 
the Honolulu Fish Auction, the auction records the species, price per pound, and total number 
of pounds for each fish sold, as well as the vessel name, and commercial license of the landing 
vessel.  
 I join observations from the Hawaii longline logbook data, and Honolulu Fish Auction 
Dealer data for trips operated between 2004 and 2013.  Because vessel names are more likely 
subject to variation in spelling, I join observations using commercial license and return/landing 
date.  Once the two data sources are joined, I generate a unique trip number from the permit 
number and departure date to uniquely identify all fishing trips.  I then classify trips targeting 
tuna as those that only deployed deep sets, defined by the number of hooks attached to the 
floating devices on the longline.  All other trips deploying at least one shallow set I classify as 
swordfish trips, and discard from the data.  For each tuna trip, I then aggregate the total 
number of hooks deployed on each trip, the total pounds of bigeye tuna landed, and the total 
value of all fish landed.  I also measure the average bigeye tuna price on the day that each trip 
landed initially landed their catch. 
Before generating the variables used for model fitting, it is important to consider the 
impact of measurement error on parameter estimates.  Both Camerer et al (1997) and Farber 
(2005) noted the negative bias in the wage parameter estimates resulting from measurement 
error in hours worked.  Because hours worked is both the outcome variable and used to 
calculated hourly wage by dividing daily wage by hours worked, even mean 0 measurement 
error in hours worked will negatively bias the parameter estimate by created erroneously low 
hours worked with erroneously high daily wage observations, or vice versa.  In this case, the 
magnitude of the bias is related to the magnitude of measurement error.  More generally, 
when the measurement error under consideration only impacts input variables, the effect is 
often assumed to result in attenuation bias. This is true only under strong assumptions and 
need not be the case more generally.  Factors including model structure, the joint distribution 
between measurement error and all other input variables in the model, and the possibility that 
measurement error is correlated with true values can affect whether measurement error 
results in attenuation bias, exaggeration of the effect, or sign reversal (Bound et al. 2001).  
Indeed, even when strong assumptions of “classical” measurement error are met, small sample 
sizes (N < 4000) can lead to exaggerated estimates of effect size (Loken and Gelman 2017).  
Common fixes used to correct for measurement error bias, such as instrumental variable 
methods, are only valid when the strong assumptions of “classical” measurement error are 
met, and the model is linear.  In many empirical cases, these do not hold, and the correction 
procedures can actually make matters worse.  When possible, data validation is a very useful 
technique for empirical researchers to quantify measurement error, and reduce the bias 
associated with it, and does not require a strong set of assumptions (Bound et al. 2001).   
 With this in mind, I construct a set of model input and outcome variables.  Because the 
return date for each trip is recorded in both the logbook form and the Honolulu Fish Auction 
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data, I am able to validate the return date for all trips.  I exclude trips where the landing date 
recoded by the Honolulu Fish Auction is more 1 day later than the logbook return date.  My 
decision to include trips where there is a 1-day discrepancy is based on wanting to reduce 
measurement error in trip length while also allowing for realistic flexibility in landing behavior.8  
For those trips that meet this criterion, I calculate a trip length variable for each trip by counting 
the number of days between the departure date and return date.  I then calculate daily trip 
wage by dividing the total trip revenue recorded at the auction by trip length.  Although the 
above validation procedure does not account for error in departure date, it is the best available 
method to remove negative bias in the parameter for daily trip wage associated with 
measurement error in trip length given data resources.  I then calculate two additional input 
variables representing the decomposition of daily wage in to a price and quantity component.  
To measure the price component, I calculate the average price of bigeye tuna observed at the 
Honolulu Fish Auction over the days of the trip.  The quantity component is a measure of the 
daily productivity of fishing, in other words whether the fishing was good or bad.  Therefore, I 
measure this by calculating the average catch rate for each trip as the total pounds of bigeye 
tuna caught divided by the number of hooks.  Although this calculation represents an 
association between two variables, it does not yield negative bias in parameter estimates noted 
by Camerer et al. (1997) and Farber (2005) because the divisor does not appear as the outcome 
variable in the model.  Because of the large sample of trips, any “classical” measurement error 
in these two variables will only lead to attenuation bias.  To give a sense of the data, Figure 1 
displays the time trend for the primary variables used in this study: trip length, average daily 
bigeye tuna price, and the log of trip catch rate. Finally, I standardize the units of both the 
average price of bigeye on the landing date and trip catch rate by subtracting the mean and 
dividing by two standard deviations (Gelman 2008).  This input standardization procedure 
allows for the comparison of effect size for inputs measured in different units, and between 
indicator parameters on the 0-1 scale. 
 
3.4 Models 
 
 To investigate how laborers respond to the decomposed components of daily wage I 
preform analysis on a set of two models.  The first model is a reproduction of empirical labor 
supply models used in previous literature.  The log of labor supply is modeled as a linear 
function of the log of wage, the coefficient of which is interpreted as the wage elasticity of 
labor supply.  This, however, estimates the sample average wage elasticity of labor supply, 
which may mask several interesting insights.  If laborers in fact respond to price signals, or 
information indicating particularly productive periods of work, then the previous model will 
only estimate the aggregate effect.  Such an aggregation may explain the ambiguous results 
                                                        
8 I have heard through personal communication that some trips choose, or are asked to land their catch the day 
after they return. 
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from previous studies evaluating neoclassical model predictions.  The second model 
investigates this possibility by modeling labor supply as a Poisson processes, where the mean is 
determined by the price and quantity components of wage.  In addition to accounting for the 
strictly positive count nature of labor supply outcomes, the estimated model parameters 
indicate the separate relationship between each wage component and labor supply.  
 
3.4.1 Log Linear Model with Wage 
 
 For each trip _, operated by vessel ! in month º, and year £, I model the log of trip 
length, log$Ñ%7B , as a normal distribution with standard deviation, =8.  The mean is specified as 
a function of the log of average daily revenue, logœÑ%7B , with indicator parameters for 
individual vessels )%lm, months 67lm, and years 5Blm, and an intercept term R. 
 log$Ñ%7B ~N.R + , logœÑ%7B + )%lm + 67lm + 5Blm, =8i0 
 
By including a set of vessel, month, and year indicators, the model accounts for vessel-specific 
idiosyncrasies, monthly seasonality, and annual trends.  The parameter of most interest is ,, 
which is interpreted as the wage elasticity of labor supply.  The estimate of , is comparable 
with previous estimates from earlier studies in the labor supply literature.  
 
3.4.2 Poisson Model with Decomposed Wage 
 
 To consider the separate effects of the price and quantity components of wage, I model 
trip length,	$Ñ%7B , using a Poisson regression.  The model is kept as similar as possible to 
previous normal linear model to make model comparison easy.  Within the Poisson regression 
framework the mean is given by an exponentiated term.  In this model I include in this term the 
standardized average tuna price on the initial landing date of each trip, ?Ñ%7B , to represent the 
price component of wage, and the standardized average catch rate for the trip, "Ñ%7B , to 
represent the quantity component, the same set of vessel, month, and year indicators as 
above, and intercept R. 
 $Ñ%7B~Poisson.¨–—“”DØW‘’—“÷'ØW‘’—◊Wÿ”—Ÿ‘ÿ”—3’ÿ”0 
 
The two primary parameters of interest are ,m and ,i representing the relationships between 
the price and quantity components and trip length.  Comparing these two parameters provides 
insight into the separate effects of the price and quantity components of wage on labor supply 
decisions.  The exponential of each coefficient is interpreted as the percent by which trip length 
changes from a 1 unit change in input.  The model does not, however, directly generate 
estimates of the elasticities of labor supply, therefore, these are calculated using posterior 
simulations. 
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3.4.3 Model Estimation 
 
 I estimate both models using Bayesian inference fitting each to the full set of prepared 
data, consisting of 9,854 trip observations from 203 unique vessels over the period 2004 to 
2013.  Computations were performed using Stan (Stan Development Team 2017), which 
implements a Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling algorithm.  Samples were obtained by 
running four parallel chains of 1000 iterations each, throwing away the first 500 as warm-up 
samples.  Posterior estimates are therefore computed using 2000 samples from the posterior 
distribution.  I monitored approximate sampling convergence using the criterion of «» < 1.1 
(Gelman et al. 2013). 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Log Linear Analysis with Wage 
 
 Table 1 shows posterior estimates from the analysis of the log linear model with wage 
measured as average daily revenue for each trip.  The primary parameter of interest, ,, is 
interpretated as the average wage elasticity of labor supply.  The median estimate, -0.04, 
corresponds to a 4% decrease in trip length if average daily revenue were to double.  This 
reduction in trip length represents the average comparison between trips that differ in average 
daily wage, but are identical in vessel characteristics, month of year, and year.  The estimate of 
the random error term, =8, is large considering the dependent variable is measured on the 
logarithmic scale, indicating substantial variation in trip length not explained by average daily 
revenue, or the set of indicators included in the model. 
 
3.5.2 Poisson Regression with Decomposed Wage 
 
 Fitting the Poisson regression model described above examines the individual 
relationships between the price and quantity components of wage and the labor supply 
decision measured by trip length. 
 Figure 2 compares the parameter estimates for  ,m and ,i, corresponding to the 
standardized price and quantity components of average daily wage.  The first observed 
difference in the two parameters is their sign.  The price component of daily wage has a 
positive relationship to trip length, while the quantity component is negatively related.  This 
indicates that trips that observer higher tuna prices are longer on average than those observing 
lower prices, while trips with high catch rates are shorter on average than those with low catch 
rates.  Because the two variables were standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
two standard deviations, the relative effect sizes of each can also be directly compared from 
the figure.  Based on the median posterior estimates, the effect size of the quantity component 
is more than twice as big as that estimated for the price component of wage, indicating that 
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differences in catch rates correspond to larger differences in trip length than differences in 
average tuna price during the trip.   
To provide a better economic interpretation of parameter estimates for the 
standardized price and quantity components, I calculate a set of elasticities of labor supply 
corresponding to price and quantity components measured at trip lengths along the 
distributional range.  Figure 3 shows five points along the range of trip lengths measured from 
posterior simulations of the baseline data, doubling catch rates, and doubling average tuna 
price.  At the five points shown, doubling catch rates is predicted to shorten the shortest and 
the longest trips, while doubling prices is only seen to predict an increase in the medium-long 
trips. 
These posterior simulations can be converted into traditional elasticity estimates using 
the two equations below.  
 §$D $D⁄§? ?Ä = %∆$D100% §$' $'Ä§" "Ä = %∆$'100% 
 
The predicted percent change in trip length resulting from the simulated change in price and 
quantity components is given by %∆$D and %∆$' respectively. Computations are made easier 
by simulating a doubling of both the price and quantity components making the denominator 1.  
The calculated elasticities of labor supply for the five points in Figure 3 are shown in Table 2.  
One of the features of calculating elasticities from posterior simulations is that elasticities can 
be measured at individual percentiles rather than as a sample average.  Average elasticities of 
labor supply can also be calculated over the entire set of 2000 posterior draws by 
approximating the expected trip length for each scenario as the mean of draws.  These 
calculations result in estimates of average price elasticity of labor supply of 0.03, and catch rate 
elasticity of labor supply of -0.01. 
Figure 4 displays the posterior estimates for the set of indicators included in model.  
Estimates of the indicators for month of year, 6, show that September has the longest trips on 
average, and January the shortest, with a clear seasonal cycle.  Average trip length is also 
estimated to be increasing over the years as seen in the year indicator estimates, 5.  Since 
2009, however, average trip length has been relatively constant.  Finally, the vessel-specific 
indicators, ), show large differences in average trip length between vessels.  This indicates a 
large amount of trip length variation owes to vessel-specific idiosyncrasies. 
 The standardization procedure used to scale the price and quantity components of wage 
also allows direct comparison between those estimates and the effect sizes of parameter 
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estimates for indicator variables measured as 0 or 1.  Comparing the largest and smallest 
estimates from each set of indicators provides a sense of the relative effect sizes for months, 
years, and vessels.  Months and years have about the same effect size measuring the median 
estimates for the largest and smallest indicators.  Vessel-specific indicators have an effect size 
nearly four times larger.  All of these are much larger than the two continuous variables 
measuring the price and quantity components of wage. 
 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 Over the period for which I have data, trip records indicate that the relationship 
between wage and labor supply can be decomposed into two separate components with 
opposite relationships to labor supply decisions.  Fishers on average take longer trips when the 
average fish price is high but take shorter trips when the average catch rate is high.  By 
comparing the effect size of the two estimates, the negative effect of higher catch rates is more 
than twice the positive effect of higher prices.  Both components contribute to the average 
daily wage for each trip, suggesting distinct responses of laborers to two different information 
signals composing daily wage, with catch rates providing the dominant signal.   
Comparing the estimates of the decomposed wage components to the log-linear 
estimate using an aggregate measure of daily wage, it appears that daily wage masks an 
important positive relationship between prices and labor supply decisions.  Although the 
estimate using daily wage presented here is substantially smaller than that estimated by 
Nguyen and Leung (2013), it is consistent in sign, suggesting the wage elasticity of labor supply 
for tuna fishers is indeed negative.  However, the results from the decomposed wage model 
indicate the negative sign may be driven by an underlying relationship between catch rates and 
trip length.  Separating this quantity component from the price component of daily wage 
reveals a previously hidden positive relationship between price and trip length.  
 There may be several reasons why the relationship between the components of wage 
differ from one another and from the aggregate measure of wage as average daily revenue.  
The first possible reason is that they may measure different things.  Each variable is an 
approximation of the underlying model factor and is limited by an understanding of the fishery 
and the availability of data.  It must be assumed that daily trip revenue, and its components are 
an accurate reflection of the relevant factors entering fishers labor supply decisions in order for 
an interpretation corresponding to these factors to be accurate.  If this assumption is not valid, 
the measured variables may be representing unrelated and spurious relationships.  However, if 
the assumption holds and the variables measure the factors with which they are assumed to 
correspond, the second possible reason for the difference in estimates is that fishers in fact 
interpret the two types of information separately.  Fishers may interpret a surge in price as 
indication that their fishing effort is more valuable and respond by extending trips, while 
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interpret high catch rates as an opportunity to achieve an existing revenue target in a shorter 
amount of time, thereby reducing trip lengths. 
 This interpretation points to a potentially interesting theoretical insight. Laborer may be 
inconsistent in their responses to the different components making up wage and span 
theoretical frameworks.  When exposed to price information, laborers may respond following 
neoclassical predictions, but respond following revenue targeting behavior when exposed to 
quantity information.  This suggests further research exploring the conditions under which 
laborers make decisions, and the characteristics of different wage information streams may 
lead to improved understanding of labor incentives and laborers responses through labor 
supply decisions. 
 This research is relevant to many industries.  Uber, for example, relies on surge pricing 
to manipulate drivers labor supply decisions and increase taxi service in areas and times of high 
demand.  Recent research suggests this strategy is effective (Chen and Sheldon 2015).  Results 
from this paper indicate the success of surge pricing may owe to signaling laborers through the 
price component of wage, rather than affecting their aggregate wage directly.  The quantity 
component, which in the taxi industry can be measured by the efficiency by which drivers link 
fares together, provides an alternative signaling path with the potential to generate an even 
larger labor supply response. 
 Similarly, this research may be relevant to fishery management where the problem of 
overfishing can be interpreted as the result of excess labor supply.  Implementing policies that 
can reduce labor supply to that corresponding with sustainable fishing levels would provide 
fishery managers with a new set of tools to achieve sustainable fishing.  For instance, periods of 
high fish price or growing demand can be identified as particularly vulnerable to excess labor 
supply and allow managers to initiate policies such as taxing landings.  With respect to the 
quantity component of wage, investing in technologies that increase catch rates, may indeed 
lead to more efficient fishing, and an overall reduction in labor supply. 
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A. TABLES FOR CHAPTER 1 
 
A1. Data summary of annual input costs in dollars for WCPO, EPO, and SF targets from the Cost 
and Earnings Survey in 2012. 
 
Inputs Mean WCPO (SD) Mean EPO (SD) Mean SF (SD) 
Fuel $154,045 (62,542) $27,134 (31,917) $16,318 (44,331) 
Captain Pay $75,700 (47,061) $13,623 (18,167) $6,962 (19,937) 
Crew Pay $47,255 (46,103) $7,245 (12,246) $1,978 (6,192) 
Bait $48,722 (17,761) $7,928 (8,635) $4,013 (10,787) 
Other $31,477 (12,796) $5,029 (5,652) $3,195 (8,844) 
Hooks $19,346 (8,583) $3,160 (3,479) $2,062 (5,618) 
 
 
A2. Time series data summary of total active and modeled vessels from the 2005 to 2013 dealer 
data.  Because some vessels fish more than one target, total vessels modeled can be less than 
the sum of each target. 
 
Year Total 
Vessels 
Operating1 
Total 
Vessels 
Modeled 
Vessels 
modeled 
(WCPO) 
Vessels 
modeled 
(EPO) 
Vessels 
modeled 
(SF) 
2005 125 105 103 41 11 
2006 127 112 111 11 10 
2007 129 116 115 53 13 
2008 129 118 115 79 11 
2009 127 120 118 73 15 
2010 124 119 115 86 15 
2011 129 124 122 83 16 
2012 129 128 127 94 17 
2013 135 126 124 83 10 
1Data from https://pifsc-www.irc.noaa.gov/library/pubs/DR-14-016.pdf. 
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A3. Summary of calibrated parameters for vessels modeled vessel and target-specific PMP model.  The mean and standard deviation 
for each target-specific parameter are given. 
 
Description Symbol WCPO EPO SF 
Scale parameter ! 1,104.02 (418.80) 382.38 (305.60) 1,629.79 (496.58) 
Shadow value " -7.70 (NA) -7.57 (NA) -4.45 (NA) 
Unobserved price of catch # 17.42 (4.65) 24.00 (16.33) 10.41 (2.32) 
Share parameter for fuel $%&'(  0.42 (0.10) 0.57 (0.24) 0.89 (0.16) 
Share parameter for captain pay $)*+ 0.19 (0.08) 0.14 (0.10) 0.04 (0.07) 
Share parameter for crew pay $),'- 0.12 (0.09) 0.08 (0.08) 0.02 (0.02) 
Share parameter for bait $.*/0  0.13 (0.03) 0.10 (0.06) 0.02 (0.04) 
Share parameter for other $102',  0.08 (0.03) 0.07 (0.04) 0.02 (0.03) 
Share parameter for gear $3'*,  0.05 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
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A4. Mean observed and the median difference between observed and predicted input expenditures.  Observed data came from the 
2005 Cost and Earnings Survey.  All values are adjusted to 2012 dollars.  The median difference and p-values are from a two-sample 
paired Wilcoxon test. 
 
 WCPO EPO SF 
Inputs Mean Observed 
(dollars) 
Median 
Predicted 
Difference (P-
value) 
Mean Observed 
(dollars) 
Median 
Predicted   
Difference (P-
value) 
Mean Observed 
(dollars) 
Median 
Predicted 
Difference (P-
value) 
Fuel 106,532 -25,324 
(<0.001) 
10,972 9,388 
(0.059) 
22,349 -4,563 
(NA) 
Captain Pay 84,114 -19,017 
(0.038) 
7,404 5,789 
(0.101) 
11,937 4,229 
(NA) 
Crew Pay 56,204 -27,395 
(<0.001) 
5,150 3,523 
(0.022) 
9,744 6,471 
(NA) 
Bait 39,544 45 
(0.984) 
3,627 5,141 
(0.007) 
8,312 7,561 
(NA) 
Other 32,259 -5,599 
(0.011) 
2,635 2,920 
(0.011) 
4,785 10,807 
(NA) 
Gear 17,426 -1,136 
(0.389) 
1,430 2,153 
(<0.001) 
4,006 3,866 
(NA) 
Sample 71 25 1 
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B. FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 1 
 
B1. Evaluation of model predictions of individual vessel catch for bigeye in the WCPO (red), bigeye in the EPO (green), and swordfish 
(blue) from 2009-2013.  The solid line indicates the 45-degree line.  The correlation coefficient and R-Squared from the linear model 
are given in the top-left corner of each plot.  Axes are scaled so the maximum catch is 1 to prevent disclosure of confidential data. 
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B2. Distribution of responses for individual vessels measured by the percent change from 2012 
catch levels.  Results from 10% increase in annual catch constraint from 2012 are given filled 
black and represent increases in catch. Results from 10% decrease in annual catch constraint 
from 2012 are filled red and represent decreases in catch. 
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B3. Sensitivity analysis measuring the effect from changing assumed supply elasticity and 
substitution elasticity values on model prediction results from 2009-2013. 
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C. TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
C1. Posterior estimates of the primary model parameters and calculated !" measure of 
convergence. 
 
Parameter Description Mean 2.5% 97.5% !" # Productivity scalar 568.26 529.47 608.78 1.01 $% Input share of deep sets 0.34 0.32 0.37 1.00 $& Input share of shallow sets 0.66 0.63 0.68 1.00 ' Input elasticity of substitution 1.10 1.00 1.21 1.00 () Random error term for model of aggregated 
output 
0.18 0.17 0.19 1.00 
* Environmental efficiency 0.0015 0.0012 0.0017 1.00 +% Coefficient of beta regression for share of 
catch that is bigeye tuna 
0.09 0.06 0.13 1.00 
+& Coefficient of beta regression for share of 
remaining catch that is swordfish 
-2.05 -2.12 -1.98 1.00 
,% Variance of beta regression for share of catch 
that is bigeye tuna 
0.47 0.01 1.33 1.00 
,& Variance of beta regression for share of 
remaining catch that is swordfish 
1.13 0.64 1.99 1.00 
-% Probability of the share of total catch that is 
bigeye tuna is 0 
0.0007 0.0000 0.0026 1.00 
-& Probability of the share of remaining catch 
that is swordfish is 0 
0.0173 0.0110 0.0250 1.00 
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D. FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
D1. Sampling process for the four chains displayed for 9 model parameters. 
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D2. Ranked estimates of vessel-specific technical efficiency with medians indicated by dots and 
10%-90% ranged indicated with lines. 
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D3. Posterior predictive checks comparing observed (grey) and predicted (green) model 
outcomes. 
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D4. Summary of results from the decision analysis.  Panel A displays the optimal regulation 
across the set of sea turtle values with red dashed line at $5 million for reference.  Panel B 
shows the aggregate expected catch at each regulatory decision level, and Panel C shows the 
expected number of turtle interactions for either Loggerheads or Leatherbacks at each 
regulatory decision level. 
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E. TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
 
E1. Posterior estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply, $, and standard deviation of error 
term, (., for the log-linear model with aggregate measure of wage as average daily trip 
revenue. 
 
Parameter 2.5% 50% 97.5% !" $ -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 1.0 (. 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.0 
 
 
 
E2. Calculated price elasticities of labor supply and catch rate elasticities of labor supply for the 
five percentiles shown in Figure 3. 
 
 10-percentile 20-percentile 50-percentile 80-percentile 90-percentile /0 01/2 21   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00 /0 01/3 31   -0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03 
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F. FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
 
F1. Trip length, average daily tuna price, and the logarithm of catch rates for trips observed 
over the sample period from 2004 to 2013.  Dots indicate trips or days in the case of average 
daily tuna price, and green line indicates the 40-day moving average. 
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F2. Coefficients (and 10%-90% interval) of the price (Beta 1), and quantity (Beta2) components 
from the Poisson regression model. 
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F3. Posterior simulations of trip lengths for baseline data, data with doubled catch rates, and 
data with doubled price. Point indicates median predicted trip length, thick line indicates 20%-
80% range, and thin line indicates 10%-90% range. 
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F4. Coefficients (and 10%-90% interval) for month indicators, year indicators, and vessel-
specific indicators (Alphas) ranked in increasing order, modeled in the Poisson regression with 
price and quantity wage components. 
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